In the last months of 2024, the second most powerful organized crime faction in Brazil, the Red Command (CV), initiated a new phase of warfare in the Metropolitan Region of Rio. This event has led to a significant increase in violence in several locations throughout the Baixada Fluminense, the North Zone, and especially the West Zone. The group’s strategy, which has seen significant success, is beginning to reveal itself, indicating the formation of a “belt” that would facilitate advancement into other areas of the Rio de Janeiro metropolis and the emergence of new conflicts. The government’s response has been ineffective, once again resorting to federal aid and utilizing punctual operations in the strongholds of organized crime but lacking a strategy for occupying the areas, which facilitates the return of the groups once the police withdraw.
Mega-Operation Tries to Stop Red Command’s Advance
On 27 February, 2024, a mega-operation involving more than 500 agents was carried out by the Military Police of Rio de Janeiro. The targets encompassed more than 13 communities under the control of the Red Command (CV), distributed between the North Zone, the West Zone, and the Baixada Fluminense. The areas of joint action indicate the locations currently in the dispute or used to support invasions of territories belonging to the Third Pure Command (TCP) or various militias in Rio de Janeiro. The communities where the police operation took place include:
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North Zone:
1. Complexo do Alemão
2. Complexo da Penha
3. Complexo da Maré
4. Flexal (Inhaúma)
5. Engenho da Rainha
6. Juramentinho
7. Ipase
8. Guaporé
9. Tinta
10. Quitungo
West Zone:
11. Chacrinha
12. Cidade de Deus
South Zone:
13. Rocinha
Baixada Fluminense:
14. Trio do Ouro (São João de Meriti)
The government’s initiative is a response to the new phase of the CV expansion campaign, occurring approximately one year after another milestone in this war: a large operation that advanced on the militia’s stronghold in the West Zone in early 2023, when Gardênia Azul, at the entrance to Barra da Tijuca and near Linha Amarela Expressway, was invaded for the first time.
The new stage highlighted in this article is characterized by the continuation of conflict in some regions, where the CV seeks to solidify its recent achievements, and by new advances in places previously unaffected.
According to local newspapers, the oldest faction in Brazil used the pre-Carnival period and festivities to begin these new invasions. These actions shifted the criminal presence in the Metropolitan Region, further deteriorating public security in some neighborhoods and zones.
A Brief History
From the 1980s to the mid-2000s, militias heavily expanded across the city’s West Zone. In 2004, the first militia was created in Rio das Pedras, which helped found another similar group that would become the largest in the city, the Justice League, in the region of Campo Grande and Santa Cruz.
This growth caught the attention of authorities, leading to the creation of the Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry (CPI) of the Militias of the Legislative Assembly of Rio de Janeiro. The CPI caused significant losses to the militias’ leadership and destabilized them. In response, these organizations underwent reformulations in leadership, methods, and principles.
The CPI, which was concluded in 2008, revealed facts about organized crime previously restricted to the streets, such as the intrinsic relationship between militias, community needs, security forces, and politics. Numerous leaders were arrested, including public authorities such as former military police officer Ricardo Teixeira Cruz, alias Batman; former councilman Jerônimo Guimarães Filho, alias Jerominho; former state representative Natalino Guimarães; former councilman Josinaldo Francisco da Cruz, alias Nadinho. Additionally, within ten years after the commission, 53 of these investigated men were murdered.
The power vacuum caused by the killings and arrests brought different figures into militia command. The Justice League, for example, which had been commanded by the aforementioned individuals, ceased opposing trafficking. Weakened and seeking survival, it aligned with one of the main enemies of the CV, the TCP, in a classic case of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend”. In 2010, former drug dealers were accepted into the militia, along with the sale of drugs, in exchange for a share in the profits. There was an expansion in the exploitation of new services, primarily the illegal use of reserve lands and lands of social interest for real estate developments.
However, it is worth noting that once widely seen as a possible solution to urban violence and the advance of drug trafficking, these criminals had already been transformed even before the CPI. This transformation became more evident when they made mandatory the “security fees” charged to merchants and residents and began to extort and punish with death those who refused to pay.
Under the new leadership of Carlos Alexandre Braga, alias Carlinhos Três Pontes, from 2010 onwards, the former Justice League was renamed the CL’s Militia. The group expanded to the Baixada Fluminense and the interior of Rio de Janeiro, becoming the largest in the state.
Such expansion did not come without problems. Internal disagreements, deaths, especially that of Carlinhos Três Pontes in 2017 and his successor and brother, Ecko, in 2021, and arrests of leaders, such as that of Zinho in December 2023, led to the fragmentation of the group. The Rio das Pedras militia also suffered losses, such as the death of Rodrigo Dias, alias Pokémon, in 2023, which destabilized the group and possibly facilitated the loss of territories in the current war with the CV.
From 2006 to 2021, militias increased their territories by 387.3%, according to data from the organization Fogo Cruzado released in 2022. These criminals then came to rule 49.9% of the areas under the control of armed groups or 10% of the entire area of the Metropolitan Region of Rio. In terms of population, the militias are believed to encompass 1.7 million people living within their zones.
On the other hand, although the CV increased its domains by 58.8% in the same period, with 2 million citizens in its territory, the faction lost 31.2% of its share in the dominated areas, from 58.6% to 40.3%. The CV’s expansionist campaign is, therefore, a response to that of its opponents in organized crime.
The Conflict Areas
The new phase of the CV’s expansion over its opponents has led to disputes in the Baixada Fluminense, the West Zone, and the North Zone, according to police and media sources. Consequently, it has intensified conflicts with militiamen and drug traffickers who control the communities in these areas.
Currently, there are six major conflict regions: Grande Barra da Tijuca, Jacarepaguá, and Campo Grande in the West Zone; Penha in the North Zone; and Nova Iguaçu and Queimados in the Baixada Fluminense:
1. Grande Barra da Tijuca (Locations: Anil, Cidade de Deus, Muzema, Tijuquinha, and Gardênia Azul): CV/Militia vs. Militia
2. Jacarepaguá (Locations: Morro do Dezoito, Campinho, Praça Seca, Quintino, Morro da Caixa d’Água, Colônia, César Maia, Tanque, and Taquara): CV vs. Militia
3. Campo Grande (Location: Carobinha): CV/ADA vs. Militia
4. Penha (Locations: Cinco Bocas, Guaporé, Quitungo, Cidade Alta, Pica Pau, and Penha Circular): CV vs. TCP
5. Queimados (Location: Morro da Torre): CV vs. TCP
6. Nova Iguaçu (Location: KM-32): CV vs. TCP
In the West Zone, the birthplace of the militias, is precisely where the CV has made the greatest advances. The faction focused on controlling smaller favelas dominated by militias. The primary objective would be to create a kind of “belt” that would allow criminals to seek refuge, support, and logistics, in addition to facilitating their escape to other locations in the capital through the multiple forested areas in the Tijuca Forest, which connect the communities of the West Zone with others in the South Zone and the North Zone. Simultaneously, this strategy would bring them closer to other places to be conquered in the West Zone, such as Guaratiba and Recreio, where militias predominate.
In a campaign now in its second year, 14 communities have been conquered, accentuating the Militia’s loss of ground in the West Zone. The areas conquered include: Santa Maria, Teixeiras, Covanca, Bateau Mouche, Morro do Barão, Chacrinha, Chácara, Quiririm, Morro da Tirol, Quitite, Araticum, Jordão, Banco, Muzema.
It is also in this area of the city that the CV seems to have made peace with a historical rival, the Friends of Friends (ADA) faction, to take over the community of Carobinha, in Campo Grande. In a recent episode of this dispute, on March 8, after confronting the CV and the ADA in the favela, a reinforcement group of 15 militiamen was intercepted by the Federal Highway Police (PRF) on Avenida Brasil. There was a shootout, resulting in 6 criminals injured and 9 arrested.
In the North Zone, the CV faces the TCP for the dominance of Cinco Bocas, Guaporé, Quitungo, Cidade Alta, Pica-Pau, and Penha Circular. Quitungo and Guaporé have already been taken.
In the Baixada Fluminense, clashes occur mainly between militias and CV. In the city of Nova Iguaçu, drug traffickers seek to take over the region known as KM 32. In Queimados, the target is Morro da Torre, on one side of the train track. CV incursions come from the São Simão community, on the other side of the train tracks, causing frequent rail transport stoppages due to shootings.
Impact on the Security of the Region
The repercussions of this war have impacted the state of Rio de Janeiro as a whole. While Brazil showed a 4% drop in violent deaths – intentional homicides, femicides, robberies followed by death, and bodily injuries followed by death – from 2022 to 2023, Rio experienced an increase of 7.5%. Nationally, 39,500 cases were recorded, with a rate of 19.4 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants. In the state, which was third in absolute number of deaths, the count reached 3,388 deaths, with a rate of 21.1 homicides.
These increases are driven by conflicts, in large part, in regions disputed by the CV. In the Integrated Public Security Area 18 (AISP 18), representing the Jacarepaguá region, data from the Public Security Institute show a 119.3% increase in violent lethality – an index including intentional homicide and bodily injury followed by death, robbery, death by the intervention of a state agent – between 2022 and 2023, rising from 114 crimes to 250. Deaths in police operations stand out, increasing from 27 in 2022 to 83 in 2023, totaling an increase of 207.4%.
In AISP 31, corresponding approximately to Greater Barra da Tijuca, violent lethality records rose from 35 in 2022 to 110 in 2023, an increase of 214.3%. Deaths by police actions surged by 633.3%, from 3 deaths in 2022 to 22 in 2023.
In AISPs 35 and 27, which approximately represent the area of Campo Grande and surrounding areas, records show violent deaths rising from 105 in 2022 to 145 in 2023, an increase of 38.1%. However, the number of deaths due to police intervention was marginal, rising from 7 to 8, an increase of 14.2%.
Conversely, in other locations, though conflicts persist, they were more intense in 2022. In 2023, there was a reduction in registrations. In the area of the 22nd Precinct, representing Penha, after intense clashes in 2022, leading to a 118.2% increase in violent lethality, 2023 saw a drop of 29.5%. In the region of the 55th Precinct, in Queimados, after a 50.9% increase in 2022, a drop of 33.7% was recorded. In the 56th Precinct, the region where KM-32 is located in Nova Iguaçu, there was a 107.9% increase in the indicator in 2022 and a decrease of 31.6% in 2023.
While the conflict persists, in addition to criminal records, hundreds of shootings, cases of stray bullets, and routine disturbances are recorded monthly in the Metropolitan Region. Since fights between factions are challenging to gauge the impacts, we can use the mega-operation on February 27 as an example. It resulted in nine criminals killed, four suspects and two police officers injured; 69 schools and kindergartens closed – 22,500 students without classes –; two public clinics closed in a single day; interruption of 15 bus lines; placing burning barricades on roads, closing of factories, shops, and services.
Marielle’s Case – The Expansion of the Militias
On March 24, six years after the murder of Councilwoman Marielle Franco, the Federal Police (PF) arrested those accused of ordering the crime. According to the PF investigation, the crime was carried out at the behest of federal deputy Chiquinho Brazão and his brother, Domingos Brazão, counselor of the Court of Auditors of the State of Rio de Janeiro.
Together with these influential politicians from the West Zone of Rio de Janeiro, the former head of the Civil Police of Rio de Janeiro, Police Chief Rivaldo Barbosa, was also arrested. He would have authorized and acted to cover up the masterminds, in exchange for R$400,000. He would have influenced the investigations with the cooperation of the chief of the Homicide Police Station of the Capital at the time, Giniton Lages, who was indicted and is now monitored by an electronic ankle bracelet.
At the time of the crime, Chiquinho was Marielle’s colleague in the Rio City Council, and according to the federal investigation, the interests of both clashed around a theme, land regularization, represented by bill number 174/2016. Marielle and the PSOL bench in the Chamber of Deputies wanted to regularize occupied lands for social purposes, for popular housing, and for their occupation to be supervised by competent public agencies. On the other hand, the Brazão family aimed at the commercial use and regularization of condominiums for the middle class that had already been built, but in an irregular area and by the militia.
The hired gunman, former member of the Special Operations Battalion of the Military Police of Rio de Janeiro (BOPE) Ronnie Lessa, was responsible for the last plea bargains that brought the case to the present stage. Their testimonies shed light on the intricate relationships between the police, politics, and organized crime in Rio. The testimonies indicate that certain wings of the security forces and Rio de Janeiro’s politics have become a business counter within everyone’s reach, even criminal groups, which through agreements and payments can influence or “lobby” to defend commercial interests.
Lessa, a trained shooter, would have acted for many years as a hitman for Rio de Janeiro’s crime, especially for the families that ran the Jogo do Bicho and the militias. The Brazão brothers, whose political stronghold is areas controlled by one of the oldest militias, from Rio das Pedras, would have only resorted to the specialists already widely used by the bicheiros to assassinate Marielle. Thus, the plea bargain of the former BOPE has a great chance of leading to the solution of many other important cases, which, like that of the councilwoman, were obstructed by the influence of crime on police investigations.
The Government Tries to Organize a Response
If the CV manages to solidify its conquests, thus closing the “belt,” it is possible that it will be more comfortable to lead, shortly, the offensive towards the militia’s territories in more distant areas, in Recreio, in Vargem Grande, in Vargem Pequena, in Guaratiba, in Ilha de Guaratiba, and Sepetiba. The time for this action on the part of the drug traffickers would be opportune, considering the new fragmentations and consequent weakening of the militias.
With Zinho’s arrest, media reports indicate that his territory has been divided among four members, who even have minor conflicts among themselves. This is in addition to the old division that emerged after the death of Carlinhos Três Pontes, which was due to the rupture of militiaman Danilo Dias Lima, alias Tandera, with the group. He kept the territories of the Baixada Fluminense but disappeared and had his area divided among three of his commanders.
With the conflicts going on for more than a year, the police operations do not seem to have had the desired effect and indicate the difficulty of the police in effectively affecting the faction.
Residents of the affected areas report to the press that police operations do not have much impact because the police, unlike drug traffickers, do not take hold of the communities. The police only act with palliative measures, occupying the territory during the day, which is soon reoccupied by the criminals at night.
Seeking a new project to respond to the security problem, the state government created, in January 2022, the “Integrated City” program, which initially provided for an investment of R$ 500 million in a series of development programs in social, infrastructure, economic, and security areas.
Regarding security, the project had, as its starting point, a plan to start in the favelas of Jacarezinho and Muzema, occupied at the time by the state security forces. It would also replace UPPs in at least 6 favela complexes. However, according to Public Security expert Carolina Grillo, the project has not progressed because of a lack of investment and the absence of dialogue with the population.
Two years have passed, and the areas served by the program still suffer from violent clashes. According to the Fogo Cruzado platform, in January 2024, 20 shootings were reported in Jacarezinho, that is, 14% of the shootings recorded in the city.
Between September and October 2023, a series of tragic security events led the governor to ask the Federal Government for help. On the occasion, 35 buses and a train were burned in a single day by one militia; heavy machine guns stolen from the army in São Paulo were found near Barra da Tijuca, after being purchased by CV; three doctors, mistaken for militiamen, were killed and one injured by CV’s associates also in Barra.
Thus, a Law-and-Order Guarantee Operation (GLO) began, from November 2023 to May 2024, involving the Navy and Air Force, to be present in ports and airports, and the National Force on highways. This would be, then, another interventionist action, a cyclical measure in Rio de Janeiro, which, despite bringing some relief to the overloaded local forces, did not prove to be of lasting effectiveness.
Noticing a certain disarticulation among the local security forces, another action taken was the recreation of the Secretariat of Public Security, extinguished in 2019 by then-Governor Wilson Witzel. According to the new Secretary of Public Security, Victor Santos, it aims to “coordinate and integrate the activities and planning of the actions of the PM and PC secretariat.” One of his first missions, Secretary Victor Santos will be to create a new state security plan that will integrate the Forces more.
