In the first quarter of 2026, a series of interconnected events has brought the operational capabilities, strategic evolution, and growing political influence of Brazil’s two largest drug trafficking factions—the Comando Vermelho (CV) and the Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC)—into sharp international focus. The United States Government has been pressuring Brazil to categorize both groups as terrorists. But the local government resists this initiative, fearing loss of autonomy.
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The groups have expanded to all Brazilian states and become stronger, and after a bloody war for territory, they managed to reach a truce, despite failed alliance negotiations, in 2025. Recently, there was even a military-style training base owned by CV discovered in the Amazon Forest, which shows the capacity of such groups. Despite all of that, the Brazilian government does not see them as politically motivated. On top of that, authorities claim that they are decentralized and coordinate much more as franchises. Moreover, the Brazilian government sees this movement as a chance for the US to intervene in the country.
Expansion and Territorial Control
On March 13, 2026, police dismantled a clandestine training camp operated by the faction within the Tereza Cristina Indigenous Territory in Santo Antônio de Leverger, Mato Grosso. The facility was used to train adolescents and young recruits in jungle survival, guerrilla warfare, and the use of restricted weaponry, including .556 and .762 caliber rifles, pistols, machine guns, and a tripod-mounted .30 caliber weapon. The group has diverted most of its smuggling routes to the Amazon forest, knowing how to fight in the jungle has become a strategic for the CV.
According to investigators, the training followed a structured curriculum similar to that of formal security forces, beginning with dry-fire exercises and culminating in live-fire drills on a remote, flooded island. The operation highlights the faction’s capacity to operate in protected areas and exert influence over local indigenous communities, all in service of controlling strategic border routes near Bolivia—a region of intense competition with the PCC.
Strategic Alliances and Internal Fractures
On February 25, 2025, leaders of the CV and PCC negotiated a strategic alliance via WhatsApp. The agreement, brokered by Edgar Alves (Doca) of the CV and a representative identified only as “São Paulo” of the PCC, was formalized with an updated CV statute incorporating rules of non-aggression under the guiding principle that “crime strengthens crime.”
This alliance proved short-lived. By late April 2025, the pact had collapsed. According to investigative findings, the PCC withdrew its support due to objections to the CV’s extreme violence—exemplified by the brutal killing of a tourist—and ongoing disputes over drug trafficking routes. Despite the rupture, authorities report that the factions currently maintain a fragile, informal truce aimed at avoiding large-scale confrontations, punctuated only by isolated incidents of violence.
Geopolitical Leverage and Diplomatic Confrontation
The transnational operations of the CV and PCC—with the CV maintaining ties to at least eight Latin American countries and the PCC operating in at least sixteen—have transformed them from a domestic security issue into a central point of tension in U.S.-Brazil relations. Since 2025, the U.S. government has debated designating the two factions as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs), a classification applied to groups such as Mexico’s Jalisco New Generation Cartel. By March 2026, the U.S. had reportedly prepared documentation to advance this designation.
The Brazilian government has mounted an urgent diplomatic effort to prevent this outcome. On March 8, 2026, Foreign Minister Mauro Vieira directly appealed to U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, requesting that the decision be postponed until a planned meeting between President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and President Donald Trump. Brazilian officials fear that an FTO designation would not only empower domestic political opponents but also threaten national sovereignty by potentially allowing U.S. intervention in Brazilian territory and enabling scrutiny of domestic financial systems such as Pix.
Sovereignty and Political Boundaries
The sovereignty concerns underlying the FTO dispute have manifested in a direct political confrontation. On March 13, 2026, President Lula’s government barred Darren Beattie, a U.S. presidential advisor, from entering Brazil after he sought to visit the imprisoned former president Jair Bolsonaro. The move, executed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was publicly framed as a reciprocal response to the U.S. cancellation of a Brazilian minister’s visa in late 2025.
Behind this action lies a broader strategic calculus. With presidential elections approaching in October 2026, the Brazilian government seeks to delineate the limits of American political influence and counter the potential advantage that opposition figures might gain from aligning with Washington’s hardline stance on the factions. The episode underscores how organized crime has become inextricably linked to domestic politics and international diplomacy.
Analysis
Collectively, these events reveal the growing power and sophistication of the CV and PCC across three interrelated dimensions:
Sophistication: The jungle training camp dismantled in March 2026 represents a qualitative escalation. By instructing members in guerrilla warfare and providing access to heavy weaponry, the factions are strengthening their capacity to control territory and resist rivals.
Transnational Expansion: With presence in over a dozen countries across South America, the factions have become significant actors in regional criminal economies. Their international footprint has elevated them from a Brazilian public security issue to a matter of bilateral concern with the United States, constraining the government’s diplomatic options.
Strategic Pragmatism: The failed 2025 alliance demonstrates that while the CV and PCC remain rivals, they are capable of strategic coordination when mutual interests align. This adaptability, combined with their considerable influence in politics and growing territorial presence, makes them a formidable challenge to state institutions.
Brazil now faces a complex landscape in which organized crime intersects with public security, diplomatic relations, and electoral politics. The government’s current response remains fragmented—alternating between localized police operations and high-level international negotiation—with no unified strategy to address the structural power these factions have accumulated across the country and the region.
