The Rio de Janeiro State Government will purchase 22 armored vehicles—commonly known as caveirões—for use in high-risk operations. According to a technical document, the international bidding process provides for reinforcing the Penal Police and Civil Police fleets with imported armored vehicles. Four of these vehicles will serve the Secretariat of Penitentiary Administration (Seap) for prisoner transport, recapturing fugitives linked to criminal factions, and providing escorts in areas dominated by drug trafficking or militias. The remaining 18 vehicles will be assigned to the Rio de Janeiro Civil Police.
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New Vehicles
Eleven matte black vehicles will be equipped with B6 armor and another eleven with B7 armor, intended for tactical operations. These vehicles are expected to be delivered within three months of the contract signing. The armored vehicles will be delivered to the Gericinó Penitentiary Complex in Rio’s West Zone, where Seap’s transportation department is based. Each vehicle will have the capacity to transport up to ten armed officers, including a driver, an assistant, and eight operators, and will feature a diesel engine, 4×4 traction, a seven-speed automatic transmission, an ABS braking system with electronic monitoring for each wheel, an electric winch, and armored windows with firing ports. The model will also include an internal fire suppression system and space for weapons and collective equipment.
Caveirão Will Escort Prisoners
The procurement is justified by the need for prison officers to enter conflict zones dominated by criminal groups such as Red Command (CV), Third Pure Command (TCP), Friends of Friends (ADA), and militias to conduct operations, as these groups have leaders currently serving sentences in the state. Seap also highlights that only 14% of inmates granted temporary release return to the prison system and that some escapees seek refuge in territories controlled by criminal factions. The justification also notes that officers have been targeted by heavily armed criminals.
Three Tactical Groups
The new vehicles will support both routine operations in prison units and the activities of the three tactical divisions of the Penal Police: the SOE (Special Operations Service), the Recap (Search and Recapture Division), and the GIT (Tactical Intervention Group), which responds to riots and supports escort operations.Seap will receive two units of each model (B6 and B7), totaling four vehicles, while the Civil Police will receive 18 vehicles—nine of each type.
Disagree Experts
Robson Rodrigues, anthropologist and former Chief of Staff of the Military Police, found the purchase of armored vehicles for prisoner recapture in high-risk areas questionable. He believes armored protection is justified for transporting and escorting prisoners between facilities or to court hearings. However, the justification for searching and recapture missions in hostile areas appears unusual, as such operations do not seem to fall within the legal jurisdiction of the Penal Police. Any measure to protect public security personnel is welcome, he said, if it remains within legal boundaries and respective institutional authority.
Analysis:
The decision by the Rio de Janeiro State Government to acquire 22 new armored vehicles reflects a broader shift toward militarization in public security strategy, particularly in contexts involving organized crime and territorial control. While enhancing operational safety for both the Civil and Penal Police is a legitimate priority, the scope and intended use of these vehicles raise important questions about institutional mandates and proportionality.
The deployment of armored vehicles for active search and recapture missions within territories controlled by criminal factions suggests an expanded role for the Penal Police that may blur the lines of legal and operational jurisdiction.
There is also a symbolic dimension to this procurement. The presence of heavily armored vehicles in urban spaces can reinforce public perceptions of a state reliant on force rather than long-term strategies of prevention and intelligence. While their tactical value is not in question, a broader public security policy must balance deterrence with legality and community trust.
