President Lula’s third term enters a decisive phase marked by institutional tension, political bargaining, and unresolved campaign promises. The recent veto of the Sentencing Bill, which would have reduced penalties for those convicted in the January 8 coup-related attacks, has intensified disputes between the Executive and Congress and added to a growing list of presidential vetoes awaiting legislative review. At the same time, changes at the Ministry of Justice, the heavy use of parliamentary amendments in the federal budget, and difficulties in delivering key policy commitments highlight the challenges facing the government as it navigates its final year in office and positions amid a polarized political environment and ongoing debates over public security, governance, and democratic stability.
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Sentencing Bill
President Lula (PT) fully vetoed, on Thursday (08/01), the bill that reduced the sentences of former president Jair Bolsonaro and others convicted of coup-related acts, including the vandalism episodes of January 8, 2023. The proposal became known as the Sentencing Bill. The president’s decision, however, may still be reviewed by Congress, which can either uphold or overturn the veto. The signing of the veto took place during a ceremony at the Planalto Palace marking three years since the invasions of the headquarters of the Three Branches of Government in Brasília. At the end of last year, both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate had approved the bill allowing for a reduction in sentences applied to Jair Bolsonaro and other defendants from the so-called “core group” of the coup plot, as well as those involved in the January 8 attacks.
Analysis of the Vetoes
President Lula’s (PT) full veto of the Sentencing Bill adds to a list of 69 total or partial vetoes currently awaiting analysis by Congress. These include Lula’s opposition to provisions in the Budget Guidelines Law (LDO) that would increase party funding, expand the number of federal deputies, and standardize nationwide the maximum age for entry into military police and firefighter careers. Congressional leaders are already working to overturn the veto of the Sentencing Bill when lawmakers return from recess in February. By the end of last year, nearly half (51) of the 106 vetoes issued by Lula since the start of his third term had been partially overturned or rejected by Congress.
Ministry of Justice and Public Security
President Lula (PT) officially announced on Friday (09/01) the dismissal of Ricardo Lewandowski from the Ministry of Justice and Public Security. His departure was formalized in a letter delivered to the president on Thursday (08/01), in which Lewandowski cited personal and family reasons for stepping down. The then executive secretary, Manoel Carlos de Almeida Neto, will take over the ministry on an interim basis. Lula has not yet named a permanent replacement. Among those being considered are Petrobras’ Attorney General, Wellington Cesar Lima e Silva, lawyer Marco Aurélio de Carvalho of the Prerrogativas Group, and the Director-General of the Federal Police, Andrei Rodrigues.
Amendments by Deputies
Amendments proposed by deputies and senators consumed up to 78.9% of the discretionary budgets of ministries under Lula’s (PT) administration in 2025. This portion of the budget is not tied to mandatory expenses such as payroll and is intended to fund public policies, infrastructure projects, and the acquisition of equipment. The highest percentage was recorded at the Ministry of Tourism, which has been headed by appointees linked to the centrist bloc since the beginning of Lula’s third term. The Ministry of Sports, also led by a figure from the same political group, followed closely, with 65.2% of its discretionary budget committed to parliamentary amendments last year.
Campaign Promises
President Lula (PT) enters his final year in office without having fulfilled several campaign promises related to public security, environmental policy, labor relations, and other areas announced during the election period or shortly after his inauguration. Some of these commitments may still be implemented by the end of his third term, such as the creation of a Ministry of Public Security, but others are unlikely to materialize. In 2025, Lula is expected to focus on pushing for the end of the 6×1 work schedule and advancing the Public Security constitutional amendment. The president is set to adopt an agenda aimed at issues that directly affect everyday life, seeking to reconnect with a broad segment of society amid concerns about a possible reelection bid.
Analysis:
President Lula’s veto of the Sentencing Bill illustrates the growing tension between the Executive and Congress and signals a clear attempt to draw institutional red lines around accountability for the January 8 attacks. By fully rejecting a measure that would have reduced penalties for those involved in coup-related acts, the president reinforces a commitment to democratic norms and judicial authority, but at the cost of deepening friction with a legislature that has repeatedly shown its willingness to challenge presidential vetoes. The large number of pending vetoes and Congress’s high success rate in overturning them reflects a structural imbalance in which the Executive increasingly governs through negotiation rather than agenda-setting power.
The reshuffling at the Ministry of Justice and Public Security adds another layer of uncertainty to this environment. The departure of Ricardo Lewandowski removes a figure closely associated with institutional stability and legal restraint at a moment when public security is central to both public opinion and electoral calculations. Whoever assumes the post will face immediate pressure to reconcile demands for tougher security policies with constitutional safeguards and political consensus.
Sources: G1 [1], [2]; A Folha de SP [1], [2]; O Globo [1], [2], [3], [4].
