The imperfect peace established in February between Brazil’s two largest criminal groups has turned into a failed truce after just two months, as local rivalries trump national orders. The split between the criminal factions First Capital Command (PCC) and Red Command (CV) is believed to have stemmed from regional disputes over control of strategic routes for drug trafficking, arms trafficking, and money laundering, according to defense attorneys.
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Violent Crimes
Discontent within the São Paulo-based PCC over violent crimes committed by members of the Rio de Janeiro-based CV also played a role. Leaders imprisoned in Bangu (Rio de Janeiro) claim that the PCC prioritizes discretion and transnational business. According to them, the São Paulo faction condemns practices such as dismembering rivals and publicly exposing crimes, behaviors often associated with the CV. Among the cited incidents are the murders of members of TCP (Third Pure Command, a rival faction).
Cultural Differences
There are also cultural differences between the groups, including the minimum age for recruitment: CV admits teenagers as young as 12 to work in drug trafficking, while the PCC reportedly only recruits youths aged 16 or older. Furthermore, the alliance was not uniformly implemented and did not extend to states such as Mato Grosso, Bahia, and Ceará.
Scams in the PCC’s Name
Police are also investigating whether drug traffickers in Rio de Janeiro have begun using the PCC’s name to carry out phone scams. In 2025, two extortion cases were recorded—one at the 27th Police Precinct (Vicente de Carvalho) and another in Niterói—in which victims reported being threatened by individuals identifying as PCC members. In one case, the victim lost R$9,300 to a man claiming to be a PCC leader. However, the cell phone showed tracking the suspect was located in the Maré favela in Rio.
Lack of Leadership
The absence of centralized leadership has further fueled local conflicts. Investigations indicate that each faction operates through its networks: CV is active mainly in the Amazon region and on routes to the Caribbean and Europe, with a strong presence in the tri-border area between Brazil, Colombia, and Peru—particularly in cities such as Tabatinga (AM), Leticia (Colombia), and Iquitos (Peru), through which cocaine is trafficked. The PCC, in contrast, dominates land routes, especially through border cities like Pedro Juan Caballero (Paraguay) and Corumbá (Mato Grosso do Sul), using highways to transport Bolivian cocaine and Paraguayan marijuana to São Paulo. Disputes over these routes and contacts have triggered tensions and violence in some areas.
Authorities in Rio Disagree
Although CV lawyers have confirmed the split with the PCC, security authorities in Rio de Janeiro remain skeptical. Among police officers, secretaries, and prosecutors, the prevailing attitude is one of caution. One of the main indicators that the alliance may still be intact, they argue, is the lack of prisoner transfer requests within the state’s penitentiary system, a movement typically expected in the case of a real split. The announcement of the breakup between the factions circulated on Monday (28/04) via WhatsApp messages and social media accounts linked to the PCC. However, authorities in Rio do not rule out the possibility that the messages were intended to divert attention from ongoing investigations, which already indicate active collaboration between the groups, including in operations such as clandestine internet services.
Analysis:
The failure of the truce between the PCC and CV reveals the deep structural and cultural differences between the two factions, which make long-term strategic alliances unsustainable. The PCC’s hierarchical and disciplined model allows for greater internal control and consistent adherence to centralized decisions. In contrast, the CV’s decentralized “franchise” structure gives significant autonomy to regional leaders, making it nearly impossible to enforce a national ceasefire.
The clashes reported in multiple northeastern and central states shortly after the truce was announced demonstrate the limited reach of any such agreement. In regions where criminal markets are especially fragmented and contested, such as Bahia, local CV leaders have strong incentives to continue violent competition rather than respect a peace negotiated elsewhere.
Nonetheless, the reduction in violence observed in states like Acre and Mato Grosso do Sul suggests that pragmatic cooperation between factions is still possible in areas where mutual benefit can be clearly defined, especially around high-value trafficking routes. Rather than a unified truce, what may emerge is a patchwork of temporary, localized agreements driven by economic logic rather than ideological alignment.
Sources: A Folha de SP; Insight Crime.
